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Abstract 
 
This chapter presents a virtue-based approach to research ethics, which both complements and 
challenges dominant principle- and rule-based ethical codes and governance frameworks. Virtues are 
qualities of character that contribute to human and ecological flourishing, focusing on the dispositions 
and motivations of moral agents (in this case, researchers) as opposed to simply their actions. The 
chapter argues for the usefulness of ‘researcher integrity’, in the context of increasing interest 
internationally in ‘research integrity’ frameworks for regulating research practice. ‘Researcher integrity’ 
is analysed, including weak and strong versions of the concept (conduct according to current 
standards, versus reflexive commitment to ideals of what research should be at its best). Researcher 
integrity in its stronger sense is depicted as an overarching complex virtue, holding together and 
balancing other virtues such as courage, care, trustworthiness, respectfulness and practical wisdom. 
Consideration is given to educating researchers and university students as virtuous researchers, 
rather than simply ensuring rules are followed and risks minimised. Several approaches are outlined, 
including Socratic dialogue to develop attentiveness and respectfulness and participatory theatre to 
rehearse different responses to ethical challenges in research.  Some limitations of virtue ethics are 
noted, including dangers of reinforcing a culture of blaming researchers for institutional failings, and 
its potential to be co-opted by those who wish to indoctrinate rather than cultivate virtues. 
Nevertheless, it is an important counter-weight to current trends that see research ethics as entailing 
learning sets of rules and how to implement them (to satisfy institutional research governance 
requirements), rather than processes of critical and responsible reflection.  
 
Key words 
Research ethics, research integrity, researcher integrity, virtue ethics, Socratic Dialogue, 
participatory theatre.   
 
Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increasing concern with ethics in the conduct of social 
research, resulting in a growth of ethical codes, guidance and policies for good conduct and 
governance. Furthermore, the discourse of research ethics has developed in such a way that 
the notion of ‘research integrity’ has emerged to offer a broader framework for understanding 
and governing the practice of research. Under this heading we now find principles, policies 
and procedures covering issues of plagiarism, the fabrication and falsification of data as well 
as protection of research participants from harm and efforts to ensure their rights to privacy 
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and informed consent are respected. Most policy and practice guidance takes the form of 
prescriptions for action and adopts a regulatory approach to ensuring good conduct through 
requiring researchers to submit applications for review by Research Ethics Committees 
(RECs). In such applications researchers are expected to evidence their knowledge of, and 
an intention to follow, what are essentially principle- or rule-based codes of ethical research. 
This chapter will discuss the concept of researcher integrity in the context of this rapidly 
growing concern with research integrity. I will explore the notion of researcher integrity as a 
complex quality of character or ‘virtue’, which has a focus on the motivations and 
commitments of the researcher as a practitioner and a member of a research community. 
This contrasts with the common focus of research integrity, which usually considers the 
integrity of the research practice – although clearly the integrity of the researcher and of the 
research organisation influences the conduct of research. I will discuss the nature of virtue 
ethics and what it might contribute to the field of research ethics, before exploring what is 
meant by researcher integrity, including weak and strong versions of the concept (conduct 
according to extant standards, versus reflexive commitment to ideals of what research 
should be at its best), and how character-based approaches to ethics complement and 
extend regulatory approaches focused on the conduct of research.  
In the light of this discussion, I will consider what the virtues of the good researcher might 
be, and how these can be effectively cultivated. This is an area that has been under-
explored to date, although the work of Macfarlane (2009) offers a useful starting point on 
which to build. I will consider how education of researchers and university students might be 
configured so as to focus on the development of virtuous researchers, rather than simply 
ensuring rules are followed and risks minimised. I will outline several approaches to research 
ethics education, including the use of Socratic dialogue to engage people in practising the 
virtues of attentiveness and respectfulness whilst discussing substantive ethical issues in a 
group; and the use of participatory theatre to act out and rehearse different responses to 
ethical challenges in research.  
Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics is a philosophical approach that focuses on the excellent qualities of character 
or moral dispositions (virtues) of moral agents. Examples of virtues might include 
trustworthiness, courage or compassion.  Often linked in Western philosophy with Aristotle 
(350 BCE/1954), virtue ethics is experiencing a recent revival in moral philosophy (Foot, 
1978; Crisp and Slote, 1997; Hursthouse, 1999; Swanton, 2003; Adams, 2006;, 2015), and a 
number of different theoretical perspectives have been developed. It is often contrasted with 
principle-based ethics (including Kantianism and utilitarianism), which focuses on abstract, 
general principles of action that pertain to right conduct, and questions of how moral agents 
ought to act and what they ought to do. In contrast, the key ethical questions in virtue ethics 
are: ‘what kind of person should I be?’ or ‘how should I live?’ 
A virtue-based approach to ethics can be regarded either as an alternative, or as a 
supplement, to principle-based ethics. In this chapter I will take virtue ethics as 
supplementary to a principle-based approach rather than as an alternative. Virtues can then 
be regarded as either subsidiary or complementary to principles. If virtues are subsidiary, 
then one approach is to take the principles and ask ‘what virtues can we derive from these 
principles?’ For example, taking the principle of respect for autonomy, we might ask what it 
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might mean for someone to be respectful towards the autonomy of others. This is one useful 
way of starting to think about how to put the principles into practice. On the other hand, if 
virtues are regarded as complementary to principles, then this entails extending the concept 
of ethics from a narrow focus on abstract moral principles implemented by a process of 
deductive reasoning, to include a range of different types of elements including a person’s 
moral character, as well as the principles that should guide their actions in a particular 
domain. On this view of ethics, virtues and principles are not in direct competition with each 
other. Rather, they are fundamentally different types of value that are not commensurable 
with each other. This kind of pluralistic ethics eschews the search for a foundational ethical 
theory (like Kantianism or utilitarianism) and acknowledges that there are several different 
types of value that cannot be ranked or weighed against each other on a single scale, nor 
derived from each other (Nagel, 1979). It is interesting that Beauchamp and Childress 
(Beauchamp 2003; Beauchamp and Childress, 2009), who have been very influential in the 
development and sustaining of a principle-based approach to research ethics, nevertheless 
reject the assumption that one must defend a single type of moral theory that is solely 
principle-based, virtue-based, and so forth. They express this view in the fifth edition of their 
text on biomedical ethics as follows:  
In everyday moral reasoning, we effortlessly blend appeals to principles, rules, rights, 
virtues, passions, analogies, paradigms, narratives and parables…. To assign priority 
to one of these moral categories as the key ingredient in the moral life is a dubious 
project of certain writers in ethics who wish to refashion in their own image what is 
most central in the moral life.  
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2001, p. 408) 
Virtues are also required to specify, interpret and implement principles. Indeed, in the fourth 
edition of their book, Beauchamp and Childress introduced a whole chapter relating to 
virtues in professional life and acknowledged that: 
Principles require judgement, which in turn depends on character, moral 
discernment, and a person’s sense of responsibility and accountability ... Often what 
counts most in the moral life is not consistent adherence to principles and rules, but 
reliable character, moral good sense, and emotional responsiveness.  
(Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 462) 
Retitled ‘Moral Character’ in the fifth and sixth editions of their book, this chapter acts as a 
precursor to their account of the principles of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress, 
2001; 2009). 
Whether we regard the virtues as primary, or as one among many sources of moral value, 
there is clearly scope to explore the nature of virtues and the role they play in the ethical life 
of researchers. The discussion that follows will be illuminated by insights from virtue ethics, 
although this does not necessarily entail subscribing to virtue ethics as an ethical theory. 
Indeed, some philosophers distinguish ‘virtue theory’ (a theory about the nature of virtues) 
from ‘virtue ethics’ (a theory or theoretical approach to ethics that places virtues at the heart 
of ethical life). Therefore my aim here is not to develop a virtue ethical theory for research, 
but to explore how a shift of focus from abstract principles and specific rules for research 
practice to the virtues of the researcher might help in improving ethical practice.  
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The nature of virtues 
In the philosophical literature there is considerable debate about what counts as a virtue, 
including whether a virtue consists in good motives, good ends/effects or whether both are 
required (Battaly, 2015; van Zyl, 2015). Given the concern of this chapter – understanding 
and improving ethical practice in social research - I will use the term ‘virtue’ to refer to a 
moral disposition to feel, think and act in such a way as to promote human and ecological 
flourishing, entailing both a motivation to act well and, typically, the achievement of good 
ends. Virtues are often described as excellent traits of character, and entail a reliable 
disposition to act in certain predictable ways across contexts.  
One of the recent challenges to virtue ethics, known as the ‘situationist critique’, draws on 
empirical (largely psychological) research to argue that the idea that human beings embody 
robust, enduring character traits may be little more that a folk concept, better thought of as a 
moral fiction rather than a reflection of reality (Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002; Merritt et al., 
2010; Alfano, 2013). For example, whether people respond in a caring way to a person in 
need seems to depend on whether or not they are in a hurry. Furthermore, as Milgram’s 
(1974) experiment infamously demonstrated, the majority of people seem to be prepared to 
torture others if instructed to do so by an authority figure. However, rather than conclude that 
the concept of a virtue is untenable, we could equally use this ‘evidence’ as part of an 
argument that becoming and being virtuous requires considerable work. The fact that people 
whom we would expect to be caring or honest may act in cruel or dishonest ways in certain 
contexts can lead to several conclusions, including that virtues are rare, or that character 
traits (and hence virtues as excellences of character) are not just qualities of the individual, 
but rather the interaction between person, social milieu and circumstances (Lapsley and 
Narvaez, 2004; Alfano, 2013; Miller, 2015; Russell, 2015b). Arguably the most useful 
responses to the situationist critique for the purposes of this chapter are those that conclude 
that in order to become virtuous we need to pay particular, conscious attention to situations 
where virtue may be hard to achieve. The analogy between virtues and skills may be helpful 
here (Annas, 2011; Russell, 2015a). As Russell comments:  
[Virtue] is the sort of achievement that takes time, effort, and focused, directed 
practice. Virtue is like a skill, but it is like the sorts of skills it takes a lifetime to 
master.   
(Russell 2015b, p. 105) 
Research integrity and researcher integrity 
 
I will now move on to consider ethics in the practice of research, with a particular focus on 
research integrity. In recent years the term ‘integrity’ has moved from relative obscurity to 
becoming almost commonplace in codes and guidance for conduct in public and 
professional life (Banks, 2010). With the emergence of well-publicised cases of politicians 
over-claiming expenses, systematic child abuse and high-profile scientists falsifying research 
results, integrity is on the socio-political agenda. In several countries agencies have been 
specifically set up to promote good conduct in research, and have ‘research integrity’ in their 
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names (e.g. Offices of Research Integrity in the USA1, UK2, Austria3 and Holland4). There is 
even a European Network of Research Integrity Offices.5  
Nevertheless, it is worth considering what, exactly, is covered by the term ‘research 
integrity’? I will start by considering ‘integrity’. Taken literally, ‘integrity’ means wholeness. It 
is about parts fitting together, and the whole being complete or in some way unified, as well 
as being undamaged or uncorrupted. It can be applied to people, objects, practices or 
institutions. It can also be applied in several different domains: for example, aesthetic, 
intellectual, scientific or moral, where it can have different meanings. 
Indeed, as James Parry (2013) points out, the term ‘research integrity’ is used in many 
different and confusing ways. Sometimes it is used as an overarching concept that includes 
all aspects of good research – scientific standards, ethical conduct and good governance. 
On other occasions it may be used just to refer to one aspect of good research – either 
scientifically good or ethically good research. Clearly scientific and ethical integrity are inter-
related – for example, research based on falsified data lacks both scientific and ethical 
integrity. And since ‘integrity’ is about wholeness, there is an argument that separation of 
scientific from ethical aspects would in itself be damaging to the integrity of the research, or 
to research in general. Certainly several of the significant codes or guides current in the UK 
that have ‘research integrity’ in the title, or are produced by an organisation with ‘research 
integrity’ in its name, embrace both scientific and ethical integrity (for example, UK Research 
Integrity Office (UKRIO), 2009; Universities UK, 2012). However, surprisingly few of these 
documents give a detailed, substantive description of what is meant by ‘integrity’. Instead, 
we have to discover its meaning by looking at the content of such documents – which 
includes principles and standards of good scientific and ethical practice.  
In these kinds of documents (codes and guidelines), ‘research integrity’ is primarily focused 
on research practice – what is actually done and how it is achieved. Obviously it is 
researchers who actually do the research, hence attention is paid to their conduct. For 
research practice to have integrity, we would expect the researchers who conduct it to do so 
with integrity.  Hence any conception of ‘research integrity’ ought to include some notion of 
researcher integrity. Similarly the actual practice of research is influenced by the ethos, 
policies and procedures of the organisation or discipline within which it takes place, while in 
turn, the integrity of the organisation and/or specific academic or professional discipline is 
related to the practices that go on within its realm, and the researchers who belong to it.  
Figure 1 illustrates this relationship between these elements of research integrity (practice, 
research, organisation), offering examples of what each of the elements might mean in 
practice, and in relation to scientific and ethical integrity.      
                                                          
1 The Office of Research Integrity (ORI), https://ori.hhs.gov/ 
2 UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO), http://ukrio.org/ 
3 Österreichische Agentur für wissenschaftliche Integrität (OeAWI, Austrian Agency for Research Integrity), 
http://www.oeawi.at/en/ 
4 Landelijk Orgaan Wetenschappelijke Integriteit (LOWI, National Board for Research Integrity) 
https://www.knaw.nl/en/topics/ethiek/landelijk-orgaan-wetenschappelijke-integriteit-lowi/overzicht 
5 European Network of Research Integrity Offices, http://www.enrio.eu/home  
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Figure 1: Elements of research integrity 
 
 
Researcher integrity 
In this chapter I will focus on what it means for a researcher to be regarded as a person of 
integrity. I will identify a ‘thin’ conduct-focused version of researcher integrity and a ‘thicker’ 
character-focussed version. It is the latter that would be regarded as a virtue.  Starting with 
the thin version, integrity in a work context is often taken to involve the person (practitioner/ 
worker/professional) being aware of, and acting consistently with, generally accepted norms 
and standards of their occupation/area of work. In a research context, this is exemplified by 
one of the seven principles listed by UKRIO in their code of practice for research: 
INTEGRITY: organisations and researchers must comply with all legal and ethical 
requirements relevant to their field of study. They should declare any potential or 
actual conflicts of interest relating to research and where necessary take steps to 
resolve them. [emphasis in the original]    
(UKRIO 2009, p. 7) 
This description of integrity is at the extreme end of conduct-focussed integrity. The use of 
the term ‘compliance’ is particularly noteworthy; use of the term suggests that there is no 
room for any critical consideration of ethical requirements, nor any non-codified context-
related variation or flexibility. Arguably this is a regulatory and managerialist version of 
integrity. It makes no reference to the researcher as a critical actor. Indeed, it could be 
Research 
integrity 
(scientific & 
ethical)
Integrity of 
research 
practice (e.g. 
valid, not 
causing 
harm ..)
Integrity of 
research 
organisation/
discipline (e.g. 
credible, good 
reputation ..) 
Integrity of 
researcher 
(e.g. rigorous, 
honest ..)
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viewed as a co-option or even corruption of the concept and practice of integrity for 
managerialist ends.     
What would a thicker, character-focussed version look like? Cox et al. (2003, p. 41) talk of 
integrity as involving a capacity to respond to change and a continual remaking of the self. 
They suggest it may be instructive to think of integrity as a virtue in Aristotle’s (350 
BCE/1954) sense, as a mean between two excesses (or vices).  In which case, it may be 
best described as standing between qualities associated with inflexibility (such as arrogance 
or dogmatism) and those associated with superficiality (such as weakness of will or 
hypocrisy). Cox et al.(2003) talk of people of integrity living their lives in a ‘fragile balance’ 
between such traits. This characterisation of integrity emphasises the psychological and 
practical work that people need to undertake if they are to maintain their integrity. Such ideas 
are particularly pertinent for the consideration of integrity in professional life. This approach  
also has resonances with Walker’s (2007) characterisation of integrity as ‘reliable 
accountability’, requiring a kind of moral competence in resolving conflicts and priorities, 
readjusting ideals and compromising principles (although Walker does not characterise 
integrity as a virtue). Walker argues that the point of integrity is ‘to maintain – or reestablish – 
our reliability in matters involving important commitments and goods’ (Walker, 2007, p. 113). 
It is based on the assumption that human lives are continually changing and are deeply 
entangled with others.  We are often seeking, therefore, a local dependability (rather than 
global wholeness) and a responsiveness to the moral costs of error and change rather than 
consistency.  
What would researcher integrity look like on the basis of this description of integrity? 
Researcher integrity, in its thick sense, is about researchers being aware of, and critically 
committed to, the purpose, values, ethical principles and standards of their discipline and/or 
broader research field; making sense of them as a whole; and putting them into practice in 
their research work, including upholding them in challenging circumstances. Stated in this 
way, researcher integrity is an over-arching, complex virtue. It entails not just upholding and 
acting upon all the values of the profession, but also working to revise, re-evaluate and hold 
them, and the profession, together as a whole.   
This clearly entails some effort on the part of the research practitioner, not only to 
understand and commit to the purpose and values of the discipline/research area, but also to 
negotiate contradictions and conflicts in theory and practice. This requires other virtues, 
including practical wisdom (phronesis) and moral courage.  By practical wisdom I mean a 
capacity to perceive the features of a situation that have ethical salience, and to make 
discerning judgements about what the right course of action might be, given the context and 
particular circumstances at hand (Banks and Gallagher, 2009, pp. 72-95; Bondi et al., 2011). 
This entails a high degree of criticality and reflexivity on the part of researchers. The notion 
of criticality entails researchers not taking the values, principles and standards found in 
codes of ethics or current practice for granted, nor taking features of situations as they first 
appear. Having a critical stance also entails closely examining and questioning a situation 
and people’s perspectives on it, uncovering hidden assumptions and unspoken implications 
and placing the situation in a bigger political and social context. Similarly, ‘reflexivity’ means 
researchers should endeavour to put themselves in the picture – seeing what roles they are 
playing qua researchers and what are the effects of their positionality in terms of ethnicity, 
gender, sexuality, age and so on. ‘Moral courage’ involves being willing and able to act on 
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one’s moral judgements when facing situations of risk or danger, being neither cowardly nor 
over-confident (Banks and Gallagher, 2009, pp. 174-94).   
Understood as a complex virtue, or excellence of character, ‘researcher integrity’ is a 
relatively demanding phenomenon. Critical reflexivity entails that researchers have 
sophisticated abilities to reflect on how they themselves perceive and think about the 
principles and rules of their organisations and disciplines – which requires what some 
organisational theorists call ‘triple loop’ learning (Yuthas et al., 2004). It also assumes a high 
degree of ethical expertise, with researchers able to take responsibility for going beyond 
extant principles and standards and offering alternative visions of good practice (Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus, 1986; Dreyfus et al., 2009).  
Taking a critical stance towards the principles and standards in extant codes of 
conduct/ethics/integrity requires a reference point outside current norms and laws. In their 
brief discussion of professional integrity as a virtue, Cox et al talk about practitioners 
committing themselves to a ‘semi-independent ideal of what the profession might be at its 
best’ (2003, p. 103). In the literature on professional ethics, this is sometimes referred to as 
a ‘service ideal’ or ‘regulative ideal’ (Oakley and Cocking, 2001, pp. 25-31; Banks, 2004, pp. 
53-8). As an ideal, it can be regarded as providing a vision towards which to work. It is ‘semi-
independent’ in that whilst it may be defined and given meaning in the context of current 
professional practice, it is also aspirational and goes beyond current practice.  According to 
the traditional view of professions, all professions have a service ideal, which encapsulates 
their roles in contributing to human flourishing. Service ideals are very general and abstract, 
such as the promotion of health for the profession of medicine, justice for law and social 
welfare for social work (Banks and Gallagher, 2009, pp. 20-27).  Whilst ‘research’ is not a 
unified, distinct profession in the same way as medicine, law or social work, it can take this 
form within particular disciplines or disciplinary areas. In the AcSS discussion document 
Towards Common Principles for Social Science Research Ethics (Academy of Social 
Sciences Working Group, 2014, reprinted in Iphofen, 2017), the elaboration of the first 
principle (regarding a free social science being fundamental to the UK as a democratic 
society) makes reference to ‘the core mission of all social science disciplines to better inform 
public debate and public policy actions’ (p. 4 of the original document).  
The idea of a ‘semi-independent ideal of research at its best’ might also be linked with 
another aspect of integrity in professional life – namely its relationship to practitioners’ 
personal lives, their commitments, and their integrity as whole people across all the areas of 
their lives. This raises many complex issues and debates that cannot be covered here. 
However, it is worth noting that, in his book on researching with integrity, Macfarlane adopts 
the idea of integrity as ‘the integration of a person’s true self and linking their values and 
identity as a person with their practice as a researcher’ (Macfarlane, 2009, p. 45).  For 
Macfarlane, it seems, integrity is not a virtue per se (it does not feature in his list of virtues 
for research), but rather an over-arching concept that frames the discussion in his book and 
perhaps covers the ways researchers hold together and make sense of the virtues of the 
good researcher and integrate these into their characters. This is not dissimilar to Aristotle’s 
account of integrity – as an over-arching virtue holding together the other virtues as a whole. 
Versions of researcher integrity 
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Understood as an excellence of character, the virtue-based account of ‘researcher integrity’ 
is quite demanding of researchers. It may therefore be useful also to outline a version of 
researcher integrity as an ordinary quality of character (rather than an excellence). In my 
view this can be positioned between the ‘thin’ conduct-focussed version of researcher 
integrity that is assumed in some of the codes of practice mentioned earlier (e.g. UKRIO, 
2009, p. 7), and the notion of integrity as an ‘excellence of character’ that I have outlined. 
These are depicted in Table 1 as three possible versions of researcher integrity. 
Table 1: Versions of researcher integrity 
 Researcher integrity 
as good conduct 
 
Researcher 
integrity as an 
ordinary quality of 
character 
 
Researcher 
integrity as a 
complex virtue 
A researcher 
exhibits 
professional conduct ordinary good 
character  
excellence of 
character 
by showing conformity/compliance 
 
ordinary 
commitment 
critical and reflexive 
commitment  
to  current standards the mission, values, 
principles and 
standards of codes 
of ethics, etc 
a semi-independent 
ideal of research at 
its best 
and a capacity to take 
action in accordance 
with standards 
a capacity to 
interpret and act on 
principles, etc 
a capacity to reason 
and act in ways that 
contribute to the 
flourishing of self 
and ecosystem  
 
Insofar as research ethics committees or institutional review boards pay any attention to 
researcher integrity (they usually focus on the integrity of the research practice as this is the 
main ‘evidence’ available to them), then it would tend to be researcher integrity as good or 
professional conduct (column 1). Research ethics committees are concerned that 
researchers follow the minimum standards that are laid down in relevant codes of practice or 
are currently accepted practices in research institutions or disciplines. Paradoxically, it is 
only after there is a complaint or allegation of misconduct (e.g. breach of privacy, use of 
questionable data) that the investigating agency (such as the employer or professional body) 
may take account of the ordinary good character of the researcher (column 2). Questions 
may be asked, such as: was this an isolated incident of breach of privacy, or is the 
researcher routinely cavalier in storing data and using names; do their colleagues regard 
them as generally reliable according to ordinary conceptions of trustworthiness?  Finally, 
researcher integrity as a complex virtue or excellence of character (column 3) tends to be 
the concern of educators, research supervisors and researchers themselves, and is a quality 
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to be worked on and cultivated, entailing what I have called elsewhere ‘ethics work’ (Banks, 
2016).      
The virtues of the researcher 
The next step for anyone writing about virtue ethics in a professional context is generally to 
offer a list of relevant virtues and then elaborate upon what they mean in practice. 
Macfarlane (2009, p. 42) does this, selecting and setting out the relevance of courage, 
respectfulness, resoluteness, sincerity, humility and reflexivity for social researchers. There 
are many other virtues that could be identified as relevant and useful for researchers. Will 
van den Hoonard (2013, p. 27) has compiled a list of 23 virtues that he has inferred directly 
or indirectly from the text of Canada’s Tri-Council policy statement on ethical conduct 
(Canadian Institutes of Health Research et al., 2010). Top of the list is ‘respect’, followed by 
a cluster called ‘openness, transparency, honesty’, then ‘sensitivity’, ‘trustworthiness’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘justice’ and so on. Interestingly, only one of the top six identified by van den 
Hoonard (‘respect’) features in Macfarlane’s (2009) list. Furthermore, in neither list is there 
any mention of virtues such as benevolence, care or compassion – which, arguably, are 
particularly pertinent in social scientific research, and above all in qualitative research where 
the relationships between researchers and participants may be sensitive and often generate 
and draw on emotions. Similarly, in much participatory research (where the people who are 
usually regarded as subjects of research often play a role as co-researchers), feminist 
research and other forms of committed action research, care has been identified as a key 
virtue. Here care ethics and other situated approaches to ethics are also relevant, as well as 
virtue ethics (Banks et al., 2013).   
Any list of virtues is selective, and many virtue concepts overlap with each other. The fact 
that different authors select different virtues - most of which would equally apply to ordinary 
people living their everyday lives, and certainly to many other occupations in addition to 
research - suggests that simply producing and studying lists of virtues may not be 
particularly useful in helping us to identify what counts as a good researcher (as opposed to 
a good nurse, or a good human being). Unless they are carefully elaborated upon and 
contextualised in practice, then lists of virtues can be criticised in the same way as lists of 
principles – as being abstract and unhelpful in guiding practitioners.  However, Macfarlane 
(2009) does elaborate on each of his chosen virtues in depth, and contextualises his 
discussions in relation to many practice examples.  
In my work with Ann Gallagher on virtues for health and social care practitioners (Banks and 
Gallagher, 2009), we identified seven virtues and discussed each one in detail. Many of 
these are equally relevant to good research, and I will briefly list them here, adapted to the 
research context. This gives a feel for what such a list of virtues might look like, and may 
serve as a starting point for discussion of how useful such an exercise might be, and what 
might be included and excluded. 
List 1: Some virtues for researchers (adapted from Banks and Gallagher, 2009) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Researcher integrity.  In Aristotelian ethics, integrity was not regarded as a virtue per 
se, but as something that held all the virtues together as a whole. In the context of 
research, it means the overarching capacity or disposition to hold true to the values 
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of the research discipline or field, and to balance other virtues as necessary. It might 
be regarded as a kind of moral competence or capacity that researchers use to make 
sense of their ideals and actions as a whole and act accordingly. 
Practical wisdom (‘phronesis’) is the excellence by which researchers deliberate well 
about what to do in their research practice. A person of practical wisdom has a 
capacity to engage in practical reasoning, which includes: the ability to perceive and 
appreciate ethically salient features of situations; the exercise of ethical imagination; 
reflective and deliberative capabilities (to make judgements and act). This process of 
reasoning is used to make the appropriate practical choices that constitute good 
research.  
Courage is, according to Aristotle (350 BCE/1954, 1115a6), ‘a mean with regard to 
feelings of fear and confidence’. By this he means that a courageous person, when 
facing situations of risk and danger, is neither cowardly and lacking in confidence, 
nor foolhardy and over-confident.  We need to know what is the right thing to fear and 
how much to fear. Courage is a complex virtue – with distinctions often being made 
between moral, physical and psychological courage, for example. Moral courage may 
be required as a researcher to face dangerous and risky situations or to 
communicate unwelcome research findings to research commissioners or funders.  
Respectfulness towards someone or something entails acknowledging the value of 
the person or thing, preserving and/or not destroying it and engaging with what is 
valued. Respectful researchers make use of the self in developing relationships and 
getting to know and understand the perspective of those people with whom they 
work, respecting their dignity, privacy and choices as far as possible.   
Care is about how one person relates to others, related to the goal of enhancing the 
existence of the others. A caring person in a research context is one who has a 
motive of attentiveness towards particular others for whom the researcher enters into 
relationships of responsibility.       
Trustworthiness is about not letting others down. A trustworthy researcher is 
someone who behaves as relied upon; is aware and accepts that they are liable to be 
held responsible for this behaviour; and is able to give a plausible performance as a 
reliable and responsible person.  
Justice is associated with the fair allocation of benefits and burdens, and relies upon 
a capacity to make good judgements in weighing up how people should be treated.  
A just researcher is someone who has a disposition to act fairly in relation to 
individuals to whom she or he owes a particular obligation and to act in a way that 
promotes and reflects just social arrangements.   
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
In a brief chapter ‘Learning about the virtues’, Macfarlane (2009) considers approaches to 
teaching postgraduate research students about research ethics. He criticises current 
education and training as focusing on discourses of compliance, extreme examples of 
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wrong-doing and theoretical approaches drawn from principle-based ethics. He argues for 
more ‘fine-grained’ scenarios, including students’ own stories and use of narratives, but does 
not develop these ideas in any detail (Macfarlane, 2009, pp. 156-58). I will consider what 
might be involved in cultivating researchers of integrity and illustrate with examples from 
university-based education.           
Cultivating researchers of integrity 
I have described researcher integrity in its strong sense as a complex, overarching virtue. In 
the context of research, it might be regarded as the reliable disposition of researchers to 
hold true to the values of the research discipline or field and to balance the specific virtues 
relevant to research, enabling them to make sense of and critically re-evaluate their ideals 
and actions as a whole and act accordingly. We might expect a researcher of integrity to 
have at least the following characteristics:    
 A situated understanding of the ideals and values of good research and the nature of 
the virtues relevant to the role of researcher. For example, what is meant by 
respectfulness, courage, honesty, trustworthiness, justice and care in a research context, 
and how do they relate to each other?   
 A critical and emotional commitment to these ideals, values and virtues – sincerely 
and wholeheartedly believing in the value of respectfulness, honesty, etc., and being 
motivated to cultivate and enact these virtues.      
 A developed capacity to do ‘ethics work’ (Banks, 2016), which entails: recognising 
situations where virtues are relevant; seeing the ethical issues at stake from multiple 
perspectives; managing and engendering emotions; working on ethical identity (e.g. 
becoming and being a respectful/honest person); working on relationships with research 
participants and other stakeholders; undertaking practical reasoning, including working 
out how to act; taking action; questioning critically the currently accepted values and 
standards of research.  
If this is what it means to be regarded as a researcher of integrity, how are these qualities 
cultivated?  There are many approaches to virtue cultivation in life in general (see Snow, 
2015) and in the context of informal and formal education (e.g. Carr, 1991; Jubilee Centre for 
Character and Virtues, 2013; Carr and Harrison, 2015). I will briefly offer a few specific 
examples of approaches in supervision and teaching in universities, with slightly more 
detailed discussionsw about neo-Socratic Dialogue and Forum Theatre.   
Supervision and critical dialogue with peers in a research team – An important part of 
educating for the virtues is having role models - teachers in both academic institutions and 
practice settings. According to Statman (1997, p. 13): 
Becoming a good person is not a matter of learning or ‘applying’ principles, but of 
imitating some models. We learn to be virtuous in the same way we learn to dance, 
to cook, and to play football - by watching people who are competent in these areas 
and trying to do the same. 
This gives an important mentoring role to teachers, research supervisors and research 
leaders. For research students and inexperienced researchers, the role of the supervisor is 
crucial in encouraging critical reflection. Even experienced researchers can benefit from 
dialogue with their peers and exposure to questioning and new ideas. Such people can fulfil 
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the role of moral exemplars or role models, which is often regarded as crucial in developing 
virtues, although not without its pitfalls (Lockwood, 2009). Above all it is through being 
challenged and/or exposed to new perspectives that researchers develop their 
understanding of themselves and their research practices. It also contributes to the critical 
reflexivity that is a mark of quality social research. Writing a research journal or diary and 
then sharing with supervisors or tutors is a particularly effective way of developing such 
reflexivity.  In collaborative and participatory research, this sharing of a range of perspectives 
from peer/co-researchers is built into the process and is both challenging and productive 
(Banks, Armstrong et al., 2013). 
Working with longer, real life cases – typical textbook cases tend to be relatively short, 
abstracted from context and often constructed for teaching purposes to exemplify a dilemma 
or difficult choice (Chambers, 1997; Banks and Nyboe, 2003). This tends to encourage 
discussion and interpretation in terms of principles and rational decision-making. Real-life, 
longer cases can also be used, which give more information about political, social and 
geographical context, about the emotions, motivations and dispositions of the teller and 
other key actors, and which tell a story that might not culminate in an action-focussed 
question: ‘what would you do?’ or ‘did the researcher do the right thing?’ This encourages 
consideration of the character of the people involved, and their interactions with the 
situations in which they find themselves (see Banks and Armstrong, 2012, for a collection of 
longer cases).     
Moral case deliberation, dilemmas cafés – these methods involve people working in 
groups exploring a case presented by a member of the group (Molewijk et al., 2008; 
Weidema et al., 2012; Centre for Social Justice and Community Action, 2015). Here the 
cases are not only ‘real life’, but the protagonist is present and can benefit from gaining 
multiple perspectives on the situation described. The participants have a degree of distance 
from the case and may approach it from the ‘impartial spectator’ perspective. But because 
the teller of the case is present, more details of context can be given, the character and 
emotions of the teller are drawn out and consideration given to the response of this person in 
this context.          
Neo-Socratic dialogue – this approach was developed in Germany by philosopher Leonard 
Nelson and later modified and developed by several of his students (Nelson, 1940; Saran 
and Neisser, 2004). It involves taking an abstract philosophical question (e.g. ‘What is 
integrity/honesty/respectfulness?’ or ‘What can we know together?’) and starting by asking 
participants to give specific examples from their own experience relevant to the question 
(Van Hooft, 1999, 2003; Saran and Neisser, 2004; Banks, 2013). One example is chosen for 
deeper analysis, with the aim of the group working together slowly and deliberately to 
answer the question in relation to this example, before moving to the more abstract level. A 
facilitator guides the process, which encourages members to engage collaboratively in 
analysis and logical philosophical argument, but also requires a great deal of attentiveness 
to each other, respectfulness to alternative views, and careful listening. Group dynamics are 
very important and the process involves engaging with emotions as well as cognitions.  As 
with moral case deliberation and dilemmas cafés, the presence of the example-giver (teller) 
stimulates the empathy of the participants. In one version of Socratic Dialogue participants 
are asked by the facilitator to put themselves in the shoes of the example-giver. After the 
example-giver has fully elaborated the example, and the facilitator has noted key points on a 
flipchart (usually dictated by the example-giver) then the example starts to belong to the 
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group, taking on a life of its own, partially abstracted from the ownership of the example-
giver. This enables the example-giver to distance herself from the example and look at it with 
fresh eyes as she hears the analyses and evaluations of others about what was at stake.        
Forum theatre  - this is based on the work of the Brazilian theatre director, Augusto Boal, 
and is part of his theatre system known as ‘Theatre of the Oppressed’ (Boal, 1985, 1992). 
Forum Theatre involves a group of people working together to produce a performance of a 
scenario showing an ‘oppression’: a difficulty or obstruction - a problematic or unjust use of 
power. The scenario may be generated by participants in the workshop or performed to 
participants by others. The aim of the work is creatively to resolve, or review and re-frame, 
issues participants may not have previously analysed or expressed clearly.  The structure 
needs to focus on a protagonist, a baffled but determined hero, ‘the oppressed’. The scene 
is played once through. It is then re-enacted. Members of the ‘audience’, the group, become 
‘spect-actors’, spectators and actors combined.  They call out ‘stop’ to signal that they would 
like to try another strategy. Another person then, classically, replaces the hero, or 
‘oppressed’, to explore a new approach. Boal coined the term ‘spect-actor’ to refer to the fact 
that members of the audience (so often condemned to passivity in the theatre) can also 
become actors, both in the theatre and back in the ‘real’ world.  They play a role in the 
performance as a ‘rehearsal for change’ and also reflect on and learn from the experience.  
As Babbage (2004, p. 45) comments: ’Empathic identification and distant observation exist 
alongside each other’.  
Forum theatre can be used to work on ethically challenging situations encountered in the 
research process.  I have used this to work with people who are engaged in community-
based participatory research, involving university and community researchers working 
together to undertake a research project (Banks et al., 2014). Here ethical issues relating to 
the use and sharing of power, ownership of data and findings, communication, inclusivity 
and reciprocity can be particularly challenging (Banks et al., 2013) and participatory theatre 
can be a very useful way of exploring these and developing participants’ skills, confidence 
and, arguably, virtues to tackle ethical difficulties. If an ethically challenging event and the 
associated relationships are acted out, with participants representing different characters 
and groupings, then the possibility for empathy and wider understanding is enlarged. 
Participants can explore the emotions triggered by the situations. The ethical aspects of a 
situation can be understood as embedded in the broader context, while embodied by the 
people in the scenario. This helps develop ethical awareness, enabling people to reframe 
and re-enact situations and experience how they might achieve different outcomes and work 
for social change. People can also see and feel successes, injustices, oppressions and 
indignities that they may not have noticed or fully appreciated before. In short, working with 
participatory theatre to explore ethical issues in research offers many possibilities, including:   
 Developing attentiveness, noticing a key point when something could be done differently; 
focussing in on a particular feature of the situation. 
 Being an external critic – looking at the whole picture from a distance. 
 Empathising with the protagonist, feeling what it is like to be that person, and getting the 
chance to take the place of the protagonist. 
 Reframing, repositioning characters, configuring the scene differently. 
 Repetition, rehearsal, how to challenge the oppressor; often being courageous, 
motivated by witnessing injustice. 
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 Dialogue, sharing perspectives regarding what is going on, how to interpret, possibilities 
for action.  
Concluding comments 
This chapter has suggested that there is value in the field of research ethics in shifting focus 
from the integrity of the research practice to paying at least equal attention to the integrity of 
the researcher. This is an important counter-weight to current trends that are turning 
research ethics in to a matter of learning a set of rules and how to implement them (so as to 
satisfy institutional research governance requirements), rather than a process of critical and 
responsible reflection.  
Nevertheless, there are many critiques of virtue-based approaches to ethics and important 
reasons to be wary about an excessive focus on the character of the person (in this case the 
researcher) as moral agent. I have already considered the situationist critique (questioning 
the notion of virtues as enduring character traits), which can be answered partly by adopting 
a more social constructionist account of the nature of virtues. Another difficulty with a virtue-
based approach in a research context is that it can reinforce a culture of responsibilisation, 
where individual researchers are blamed for bad practice when it is often the case that 
institutional conditions are significant contributing factors. This suggests we should exercise 
some caution in concluding that the promotion of virtues in individual researchers is the 
solution to bad practice in research; we should not lose sight of institutional constraints and 
structural contexts that shape the conduct of research and the formation of researchers. 
There is also a question about how the notion of moral character, and educating for 
character, can be co-opted and used as a way of moulding people into a desirable form. The 
idea of character-building raises the question of in whose interests and according to what 
role model? We need to take care that we are cultivating rather than indoctrinating virtues. 
That is partly why none of the approaches discussed in the previous section is directly aimed 
at developing specific character traits per se. Nevertheless I believe they offer a relevant 
mixture of opportunities for exercising and developing practical wisdom and rehearsing the 
right emotions and responses according to context.  
In spite of these limitations, a virtue-based approach is a good corrective to the tendency to 
adopt a rule-based approach to research ethics. It conceives of researchers as more than 
simply rule-following automata. Rather they are people who respect confidentiality because 
they are the kind of people who are trustworthy and respectful in all aspects of life, not just 
because their employer, disciplinary or professional body has laid down a rule to this effect. 
Yet not everyone is virtuous, and it is not as easy to change or develop people’s characters 
as it is for people to be required to follow a rule. Rules are action-oriented and take account 
of the fact that people in the role of researcher should behave in certain kinds of ways, even 
if they do this out of duty rather than because they have a considered commitment to act in 
such ways. Specific rules are needed precisely because people are not always virtuous and 
because they may not always have the capacity (or be trusted) to make good judgements. 
But the growth of more and more rules should not lure us away from the need to develop 
researchers of integrity. This is why consideration of virtue ethics is important, because it 
emphasises the moral education and development of the researcher as opposed to simply 
training in research methodology, methods, skills and ‘ethics compliance’.  
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